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Résumé: Ce travail utilise une version évolutionniste du modèle de Kiyotaki et Wright 
(1989) sur l'émergence de la monnaie. Le principal objectif de ce travail est 
d'étudier les conséquences de l'endogénéité du processus d'appariement des 
agents. Dans ce cas, les conditions de stabilité sont trouvées pour les deux 
types d'équilibres (équilibre fondamental ou spéculatif). Le second objectif est 
d'analyser la dynamique hors équilibre quand la distribution des stocks n'est 
pas supposée avoir sa valeur d'équilibre temporaire. On montre que, pour 
certain valeurs des paramètres, l'équilibre fondamental et l'équilibre spéculatif 
sont instables. 
 
Abstract: This paper uses an evolutionary version of the commodity money model in 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). The main objective of this paper is to study the 
implications of endogenizing the matching process. Under the endogenous set 
up we find stability conditions for each kind of equilibrium (fundamental or 
speculative). The second objective is to analyse the disequilibrium dynamics, 
when the inventory distribution is not assumed to be continuously at its 
temporary equilibrium value. We prove that under this setting, for some 
values of the parameters the fundamental and speculative states are unstable. 
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1. Introduction
The neoclassical general equilibrium models get away with the diﬃculty of co-
ordination of trade in a many person economy by a fictional coordinating and
price setting central authority. The weakness of modelling trade among agents by
assuming a central authority results in a failure to model the demand for money.
The emergence of money as a medium of exchange is not explained and the de-
mand for money is rather rationalised on the grounds that it is an asset of low risk
and high liquidity. Search theoretic models overcome this failure by an explicit
modelling of resource allocation process and provide a framework where the use of
money depends on the degree of acceptance of money as a medium of exchange.
The process of search and recruitment introduces trade frictions such as bilateral
exchange, lack of commitment and memory. Such frictions generate in Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989) an essential role for money with no particular constraint that
it must be used in exchange1.
This paper uses an evolutionary version of the commodity money model in Kiy-
otaki and Wright (1989) which explores the structure of barter trades in an econ-
1Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) has been the source of a fruitfull literature. This literature is
by now large; a few examples include Kiyotaki and Wright (1991,1993), Aiyagari and Wallace
(1991,1992), Kehoe, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993),
Trejos and Wright (1995), Shi (1995).
omy with the following characteristics: There is a continuum of rational agents
living a finite but uncertain number of periods. The agents are specialised in
consumption and production and meet pairwise and engage in bilateral exchange.
The goods are indivisible and durable but costly to store. Since all goods are
indivisible, there is one to one swap of inventories in case of mutually agreed upon
trade. In this setting, certain goods emerge as media of exchange depending both
on intrinsic properties and extrinsic beliefs. These two situations are referred to
as fundamental equilibrium and speculative equilibrium by Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989). Fundamental equilibrium is the situation where agents accept a non con-
sumption good to facilitate further trade if it has a lower storage cost than the one
currently held in inventory. On the other hand, speculative equilibrium requires
agents to accept a good with a higher storage cost.
These results are obtained based on the standard assumption of rationality.
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model and most of its extensions assume that the
rational and optimizing agents are collectively able to locate an equilibrium of the
model. However, the evolutionary approach suggests that the initial population
consists of a variety of heterogeneous types reflecting all permissible behaviours
with their related material rewards. The population evolves in such a manner
that the population share of more highly rewarded behaviours grows relative to
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that of poorly rewarded behaviours. Then the asymptotically stable rest points
of this dynamic selection process are identified.
The point of departure of this paper is Sethi (1999) which analyses Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989) model of money within an evolutionary framework. In this
version of the model with exogenous random matching, it is shown that funda-
mental, speculative as well as ‘polymorphic’ states can all be stable and there may
exist a multiplicity of stable states. In order to show the evolutionary stability
of these states, Sethi (1999) uses the following procedure. Given a behavioural
population composition, the dynamics of inventory holdings are defined and the
equilibrium values of inventories are expressed. Then, evolutionary selection dy-
namics are applied to various population states in order to establish their stability
with respect to the evolutionary dynamics. The assumption behind this analysis
is that the inventory distribution is expected to be continuously at its temporary
equilibrium value even when the behavioural composition evolves.
The present paper deals with two issues. In Section 2, the relation of the ran-
dom matching assumption with the emergence of media of exchange is explored.
The standard search theoretic models assume that agents meet exogenously and
at random. This assumption is rather unrealistic since agents do not choose their
actions on the basis of random encounters. In order to make the matching process
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endogenous, matching probabilities are added to the model of Sethi (1999). The
conditions of stability of fundamental, speculative and polymorphic states are de-
fined as a function of the matching probabilities. As a second issue, in Section 3,
the dynamics of population shares are analysed when the inventory distribution is
not assumed to be continuously at its temporary equilibrium value. The assump-
tion that the inventory distribution is continuously at its temporary equilibrium
value implies that the eﬀect of changes in the inventory distribution in response to
disequilibrium is neglected. In order to take into account this eﬀect, we propose a
model with randommatching in which the population is classified according to the
inventory distribution and the behavioural distribution. This classification allows
us to analyse the evolution of population shares through trade and evolutionary
selection aﬀecting the process at diﬀerent rates. The convergence to fundamental
and speculative states is not observed for some values of the parameters. Instead
the population stays polymorphic.
2. Endogenous matching
In this section the results in Sethi (1999) are reviewed with a diﬀerent matching
setup. The notation of the original article is adopted. First, the environment is
described. Then, given behavioural population distribution, temporary equilib-
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rium values of inventory holdings are calculated. The existence and the stability of
those values are discussed. Given the equilibrium values of inventories, the utilities
corresponding to diﬀerent behavioural situations are given and the evolutionary
stability of these is analysed.
2.1. The model
Goods: There exist three indivisible goods indexed by i. They are durable.
Storing the good i entails the cost ci (in terms of instantaneous disutility).
A one for one swap of inventories occurs in case of mutually agreed upon
trade.
Time: Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ N .
Economic agents: There exists three types of agents again indexed by i.
Agents specialize in consumption and production. Agent i derives utility
only from consuming good i and produces only good i+1modulo 32. Agents
can store only one good at a time since goods are indivisible and stored at
a cost. If an agent of type i gets through trade his consumption good i he
consumes it immediately, gets one unit of utility and produces a new unit
2Agent 3 consumes good 3 and produces good 1.
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of good i+ 1. Thus agents always have in stock one unit of one good other
than their consumption good.
In period 0, n agents of each type, each endowed with one unit of their pro-
duction good enter the market. The number of agents stays fixed thereafter.
For each type of agent there exist two strategies: Agents of type i can accept
only their consumption good i when they meet another agent. These agents
are denoted by αi. On the other hand agents denoted by βi can accept both
goods i and i+ 2 if they trade. An agent of type αi has always in stock his
production good i+1. In return agents of type βi can have either the good
i+ 1 or i+ 2.
Matching: Each period one agent is selected randomly (with probability 1
3n
).
Then this agent is supposed to contact an agent to trade from the other two
populations. Agents of type i are assumed to contact agents of type i + 1
with probability πi and with agents of type i+ 2 with probability 1− πi. If
we denote by Ii the set of agents of type i and by (x, y) the pair trading at
period t then the following probabilities apply:
— Pr(x ∈ Ii) = 13
— Pr(y ∈ Ii|x ∈ Ii) = 0
6
— Pr(y ∈ Ii+1|x ∈ Ii) = πi
— Pr(y ∈ Ii+2|x ∈ Ii) = 1− πi
Therefore, the probability that agent i and agent i + 1 are matched is
πi+1−πi+1
3
. In order to simplify the notation, we will denote
ai =
(1− πi + πi+2)
3
.
The pair exchanges their inventories if it is mutually agreeable. The pair
dissolves in case of both mutually agreed trade or rejection.
Information: The agents know the types of people they meet but have no
information on the inventory holdings and the strategies of these agents.
In order to analyse this model from an evolutionary point of view we need to
allow all behaviours from the part of agents and study the ones that are robust
to a dynamic selection mechanism. Thus, the total population of agents can be
characterised according to two criteria: the share of agents adopting a certain
behaviour and the share of agents holding a certain good.
We denote the proportion of agents of type β among agents of type i by si.
Therefore the share of α agents is 1−si. The proportion of agents of type i having
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in stock their production good i + 1 is denoted by pi. Hence the share of agents
of type βi holding i+2 is 1− pi and the share of agents of type βi holding i+1 is
pi + si − 1. The player types, their inventory holdings and population shares are
represented in Table 1.
Table 1 Agent types, inventory holdings and population shares
Type Inventory holding Population shares among i types
αi i+ 1 1− si
βi i+ 1 si + pi − 1
i+ 2 1− pi
2.2. Temporary equilibrium
2.2.1. Inventory dynamics
Suppose the composition of behaviours s ∈ [0, 1]3 is given. We denote the set
containing the values of inventory holdings by ∆(s) which is defined as follows:
∆(s) = [1− s1, 1]× [1− s2, 1]× [1− s3, 1]
Agents of type αi have always in stock their production good i + 1 as they
accept only their consumption good. Therefore, agents of type αi do not have an
eﬀect on the inventory distribution when they trade.
Agents of type βi holding their production good i + 1 can decrease the share
8
pi in their population if they exchange i+1 for i+2. This happens if an agent of
type βi holding i+1 is selected and he in return selects an agent β(i+1) holding
i + 2 (with probability 1
3
(si + pi − 1)πipi+1) or an agent of type β(i + 1) holding
i+2 is selected and he in return selects an agent βi holding i+1 (with probability
1
3
pi+1(1− πi+1)(si + pi − 1)).
On the other hand, agents of type βi holding the good i+ 2 can increase the
share pi in their population if they exchange i + 2 for i + 1. This happens if
an agent of type βi holding i + 2 is selected and he in return selects an agent
β(i + 2) holding i (with probability 1
3
(1 − pi)(1 − πi)pi+2) or an agent of type
β(i + 2) holding i is selected and he in return selects an agent βi holding i + 2
(with probability 1
3
pi+2πi+2(1− pi)).
The resulting inventory dynamics is given by the following equation:
.
pi = (1− pi)pi+2ai − (si + pi − 1)pi+1ai+1 (2.1)
The inventory dynamics do not cross the boundary of ∆(s). In other words if
p(0) ∈ ∆(s), then p(t) ∈ ∆(s) for all t. To see this, notice the following limits:
lim
.
pi
pi↑1
= −sipi+1ai+1 6 0
lim
.
pi
pi↓1−si
= sipi+2ai > 0
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2.2.2. Temporary equilibria and their stability
For any given vector of population shares s ∈ [0, 1]3, the rest points of equation
(2.1) are defined as:
Φ(s) = {p ∈ ∆(s) | .p = 0}
A state s is monomorphic if individuals belonging to the same population are
of the same behavioural type. States which are not monomorphic are polymorphic.
The rest points of equation (2.1) are calculated for monomorphic populations and
the values are provided at Table 2.
Table 2 Equilibrium inventories for monomorphic populations
s ρ(s)
(0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1)
(0, 1, 0) (1, a2
a3+a2
, 1)
(1, 1, 0) (ρ31, ρ
3
2, 1)
(1, 1, 1) (ρ41, ρ
4
2, ρ
4
3)
Notice that for s = (1, 1, 0) the equilibrium inventories is given by (ρ31, ρ
3
2, 1)
where
ρ31 =
a1
2a2(a1 + a2)

a2 − a3 +
s
4a22a3
a1
+ (a2 + a3)2

 (2.2)
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and
ρ32 =
a1(1− ρ31)
a2ρ31
(2.3)
For s = (1, 1, 1) the equilibrium inventories is (ρ41, ρ
4
2, ρ
4
3) where
ρ41 =
a3 [(ρ
4
3 − 1)a2 + (ρ43)2a1]
ρ43a1a2
(2.4)
and
ρ42 = 1−
(ρ43)
2a1
(1− ρ43)a2
(2.5)
and ρ43 is given by the following fourth degree equation:
0 = ρ43(a1a2a3 − 2a22a3) + (ρ43)2(−4a1a2a3 + a21a2 + a22a3) (2.6)
+(ρ43)
3(3a1a2a3 − a21a2 − a21a3) + 2(ρ43)4a21a3 + a22a3
The set Φ(s) of rest points calculated given a behavioural population compo-
sition has at least one element for each admissible composition. The analogous of
the following propositions have been proved in Sethi (1999) for the case of random
matching. The proof of these are provided in the appendix.
11
Proposition 2.1. The set of rest points Φ(s) is non-empty for all values of si for
all i = 1, 2, 3.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose s 6= (1, 1, 1), the set of rest points Φ(s) contains a
single element.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose s = (1, 1, 1), πi 6= 0 and πi 6= 1. The set of rest points
Φ(s) contains exactly two elements, exactly one of which is stable with respect to
the dynamics of equation (2.1).
Finally, we will provide a technical proposition that will be useful in the sequel.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose πi 6= 0 and πi 6= 1. The function ρ(s) is continuous
at all monomorphic states and at all polymorphic states of the type s = (x, 1, 0)
where x ∈ (0, 1).
2.3. Evolutionary stability
Given that inventories are continuously at their equilibrium values, we proceed
with the evolution of the behavioural composition s. The evolutionary approach
analyses the population distribution of behaviours (decision rules, strategies) sub-
ject to specific selection dynamics. Consequently, we will allow for all permissible
12
behaviours on the part of agents and analyse the behaviours which will survive
the dynamic selection process.
2.3.1. Expected payoﬀs
We denote the utility of agent i by ui. According to the strategies the agents
adopt, the utility of an agent of type αi is denoted by uαi and the utility of an
agent of type βi is denoted by uβi. The expected payoﬀs to each type of player
are functions of the population composition s and the corresponding equilibrium
inventories ρ(s). The expected payoﬀ of an agent of type αi is:
uαi(s) = (1− ρi+1(s))ai+1 + (si+2 + ρi+2(s)− 1)ai − ci+1 (2.7)
where the first two terms indicate the expected payoﬀ from consumption and the
last term is the cost of storing good i + 1. Agents of type αi will have in stock
the good i+ 1 whether they trade or not.
Agents of type βi have in stock either their production good i+1 or the good
i + 2. Since the good held by these agents changes over time through trade, we
need to define the probability of holding the good i+1 and the good i+2 in order
to compute the expected payoﬀ of agent of type βi. The probability of having
i+1 in inventory is denoted by τ i(s). The probability of having i+2 in inventory
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is consequently equal to 1− τ i(s). The probability of having i+ 1 in stock, τ i(s)
is given by:
τ i(s) =
ρi+2(s)ai
ρi+2(s)ai + ρi+1(s)ai+1
The expected payoﬀ of an agent of type βi holding i+ 1 is:
ui+1βi (s) = (1− ρi+1(s)(1 + ci+2 − ci+1))ai+1 + (si+2 + ρi+2(s)− 1)ai − ci+1 (2.8)
The expected payoﬀ of an agent of type βi holding i+ 2 is:
ui+2βi (s) = ρi+2(s)ai(1− ci+1)− (1− ρi+2(s)ai)ci+2 (2.9)
Then the expected payoﬀ of an agent of type βi will be:
uβi(s) = τ i(s)u
i+1
βi (s) + (1− τ i(s))ui+2βi (s) (2.10)
Given the payoﬀs to each strategy in each population, define the mean payoﬀ
in population i as:
14
_
ui(s) = (1− si)uαi(s) + siuβi(s) (2.11)
2.3.2. Definition of the replicator dynamics
In the evolutionary setting, there are interactions among boundedly rational agents
from each of the three populations. These agents have little or no information
about the environment. In each population, we allow for all types of behaviours
on the part of agents. Evolutionary pressures select better performing behaviours
in the long run. The selection dynamics governing change are in continuous time
and are regular selection dynamics. Given the payoﬀs to each of the two behav-
ioral types in each of the three sub-populations, the evolution of the behavioural
composition of the population is given by the following system of continuous-time
diﬀerential equations:
.
si = ξi(s). The function ξ is said to yield a monotonic
selection dynamic if the following conditions are satisfied:
i. ξ is Lipschitz continuous
ii. si = 0⇒ ξi(s) > 0 and si = 1⇒ ξi(s) 6 0
iii. lim
si→0
ξi(s)
si
exists and is finite.
iv. uβi(s) > (=) uiα(s)⇒ ξi(s)si > (=) 0
These conditions ensure that si remains in [0, 1], its growth rates are defined
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and continuous at all points s ∈ [0, 1]3 and the growth of the share of β types
in population i is proportional to its relative payoﬀ. Taylor and Jonker (1978)
defined a special case of the class of monotonic selection dynamics as the replicator
dynamics.
.
si
si
= uβi(s)−
_
ui(s) (2.12)
2.3.3. Asymptotic stability for the replicator dynamics
Note that all monomorphic population states are rest points of monotonic dy-
namics. Asymptotically stable monomorphic rest points will now be described.
Notice that results analogous to the following two propositions have been proved
in Sethi (1999) for the case of random matching. The proof of these propositions
are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 2.5. Suppose c1 < c2 < c3.
1. (Fundamental equilibrium) If (c3− c2) > a1− a2+ a
2
2
a3+a2
there is an asymp-
totically stable rest point at s = (0, 1, 0).
2. (Speculative equilibrium) If (c3− c2) < a1− a2+ ρ32a2 there is an asymptot-
ically stable rest point at s = (1, 1, 0).
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The first part of the proposition describes the case where there is a fundamental
equilibrium. On the other hand, the second part of the proposition gives the
stability condition of the speculative equilibrium. In Sethi (1999), the simulations
are done based on the cost vector
c = (0.01, 0.04, 0.09)
and the replicator dynamics. At this cost vector, the population of agents converge
to a speculative equilibrium. Through holding c1 and c2 constant and raising c3,
Sethi (1999) shows that the speculative equilibrium loses stability at c3 = 0.18
and the population converges to a polymorphic state where some agents of type 1
use fundamental strategies while others speculate. At c3 = 0.21, there is a stable
fundamental equilibrium.
In this paper, the conditions of stability are expressed in terms of matching
probabilities. In order to simplify the analysis, we will suppose that agents of
type 1 and 2 will randomly choose their trading partners. Then the conditions of
stability for the first part of the proposition becomes:
3(c3 − c2) > π3 − 0.5 +
1
2.5− π3
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A graphical analysis will show that based on the same cost vector, up to
π3 = 0.21, the fundamental equilibrium is stable (the intersection of the dashed
curve and the solid horizontal line representing 3(c3 − c2) in Figure (2.1)). On
the other hand, the conditions of stability for the second part of the proposition
becomes the following complicated equation:
3(c3 − c2) <
−3(1− π3)2 +
p
9π3 − 2.5π23 − 4π33 + π43 + 4.5625− 1.25
3− 2π3
In order to visualise this function, we provide the graph of the right hand side by
the solid curve in Figure (2.1). It shows that above π3 = 0.38, the speculative
equilibrium is stable based on the same cost vector (the intersection of the solid
curve and the solid horizontal line representing 3(c3 − c2)).
Proposition 2.6. Suppose c1 < c2 < c3.
If a1−a2+
−a1(1−a1)+
√
a21(1−a1)2+4a1a22(1−a2−a1)
2(1−a1−a2) < (c3−c2) < a1−a2+
a22
1−a1 there
is an asymptotically stable rest point at s = (x, 1, 0) where x ∈ (0, 1).
When we suppose that the agents of type 1 and 2 will randomly choose their
trading partners, the previous condition of stability becomes:
18
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Figure 2.1: The first and second condition of stability in terms of π3
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−3(1− π3)2 +
p
9π3 − 2.5π23 − 4π33 + π43 + 4.5625− 1.25
3− 2π3
< 3(c3 − c2) < π3 +
1
2.5− π3
− 0.5
In order to visualise this function, we can use the same graph we used for the
stability of the fundamental and speculative equilibrium (2.1) since the right and
left hand sides turn out to be the same equations as the previous equations for the
stability of the fundamental and speculative equilibrium. We can also conclude
that when π3 varies between 0.21 and 0.38, the polymorphic equilibrium is stable.
3. Disequilibrium dynamics
In the previous section, given various initial distributions of strategies, the rest
points of inventory dynamics are determined. Then the robustness of these distri-
butions of strategies is checked. The assumption that the inventory distribution is
continuously at its temporary equilibrium value implies that the eﬀect of changes
in the inventory distribution in response to disequilibrium is neglected. In this
section, the population shares change according to trade and evolutionary selec-
tion aﬀecting the process at diﬀerent rates. Thus the inventories are allowed to
20
be in disequilibrium. The dynamics are studied with πi = 0.5 for all i = 1, 2, 3.
3.1. The model
The description of the previous section will be used. In order to analyse this
model from an evolutionary point of view, we consider that the agents may change
their strategies. The total population of agents in a group can be characterised
according to two criteria: the strategy they adopt (either α or β) and the good
they have in stock (either i + 1 or i + 2). Consequently, each group is composed
of four categories. We denote the proportion of agents of type αi having in stock
their production good i+1 by ei and the proportion of agents of type αi having in
stock the good i+2 by fi. The share of agents of type βi holding i+1 is denoted
by gi and the share of agents of type βi holding i + 2 by hi. The player types,
their inventory holdings and population shares are represented in Table 3.
Table 3 Agent types, inventory holdings and population shares
Type Inventory holding Population shares among i types
αi i+ 1 ei
αi i+ 2 fi
βi i+ 1 gi
βi i+ 2 hi
21
Given the previous definition of population shares, the population of agents
can be represented by the matrix r = (σ1,σ2,σ3) where σ1, σ2 and σ3 are the
row vectors σ1 = (e1, f1, g1), σ2 = (e2, f2, g2) and σ3 = (e3, f3, g3). We define the
utility of agent i according to the group they belong (for example the utility of
an agent of type αi holding in stock the good i + 1 will be denoted by uei(r)).
Consequently there will be four utility functions for each group.
The expected payoﬀ to an agent of type αi holding the good i+ 1 is:
uei(r) =
1
3
(fi+1 + hi+1) +
1
3
gi+2 − ci+1 (3.1)
The expected payoﬀ to an agent of type αi holding the good i+ 2 is:
ufi(r) =
1
3
(ei+2 + gi+2)(1− ci+1)− (1−
1
3
(ei+2 + gi+2))ci+2 (3.2)
The expected payoﬀ to an agent of type βi holding the good i+ 1 is:
ugi(r) =
1
3
(fi+1+hi+1)+
1
3
(ei+2+gi+2)−
1
3
(ei+1+gi+1)ci+2−(1−
1
3
(ei+1+gi+1))ci+1
(3.3)
The expected payoﬀ of an agent of type βi holding the good i+ 2 is:
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uhi(r) =
1
3
(ei+2 + gi+2)(1− ci+1)− (1−
1
3
(ei+2 + gi+2))ci+2 (3.4)
3.2. Evolution and trade
The change in population composition results from the change in stocks due to
trade and from the change in strategies which is due to the evolutionary mech-
anism. We denote the change due to trade by ∆trade and the change due to the
evolutionary mechanism by ∆imit. These changes do not occur at the same rate.
In this paper, it is supposed that agents have a chance to trade more often than
they have a chance to revise their strategies. Accordingly, the rate at which the
agents trade, v1 is greater than the rate at which the agents revise their strategies,
v2 (v1 > v2). Without loss of generality, let v1 = 1 and v2 = v < 1.
The change in ei is given by the following equation:
.
ei = ∆tradeei + v∆
imit
ei
(3.5)
Agents of type αi having in stock their production good i + 1 do not aﬀect
the inventory distribution when they trade as they accept only their consumption
good whenever they trade. On the other hand, agents of type αi having in stock
the good i+2matched with agents of type α(i+2) and β(i+2) having in stock the
23
good i will increase the share ei and consequently decrease the share fi. Notice
that ∆tradeei = −∆
trade
fi
.
3∆tradeei = fi(ei+2 + gi+2) (3.6)
The evolutionary dynamics modelled in this section is replication by imita-
tion. In the previous section the replicator dynamics allowed replication by way
of biological reproduction where each agent reproduces according to his relative
fitness measured in terms of the payoﬀ for his strategy and each oﬀspring inherits
his single parent’s strategy. In case of replication by imitation, agents live forever
but review their pure strategies. Each reviewing agent samples another agent at
random from his player population.
In this model, the distribution of agents in each population does not exactly
represent the distribution of strategies since the diﬀerences of stocks are taken into
account. Each reviewing agent is supposed to meet at random an agent from his
population and imitate the strategy of the agent he meets if it is better performing.
The contribution of our model rises from the fact that the performance of the
strategies depends also on the inventory holdings of the agents. If an agent of
type αi having in stock i+ 1 meets an agent of type βi having in stock i+ 2 and
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finds out that the strategy β performs better, he will imitate this agent and adopt
the strategy β but in return he will not become part of agents βi having in stock
i+ 2. The imitation will not aﬀect the share hi.
As a result we have to define four regions and write the dynamics due to
imitation in these regions.
Regions
A ufi(r) > ugi(r) and uhi(r) > uei(r)
B ufi(r) > ugi(r) and uhi(r) < uei(r)
C ufi(r) < ugi(r) and uhi(r) > uei(r)
D ufi(r) < ugi(r) and uhi(r) < uei(r)
Note two following points.
1. uhi(r) > uei(r) whenever ufi(r) > ugi(r).
uhi(r) > uei(r) =⇒
1
3
(fi+1+hi+1−ei+2)
1− 1
3
(ei+2+gi+2)
< −(ci+2 − ci+1)
ufi(r) > ugi(r) =⇒ −(ci+2 − ci+1) >
1
3
(fi+1+hi+1)
1− 1
3
(ei+2+gi+2+ei+1+gi+1)
uhi(r) > uei(r) whenever ufi(r) > ugi(r) since we have
1
3
(fi+1+hi+1−ei+2)
1− 1
3
(ei+2+gi+2)
<
1
3
(fi+1+hi+1)
1− 1
3
(ei+2+gi+2+ei+1+gi+1)
Consequently it is impossible to be in the B region.
2. ufi(r) < ugi(r) and uhi(r) > uei(r).
ufi(r) < ugi(r) ⇐⇒ −(ci+2 − ci+1) <
1
3
(fi+1+hi+1)
1− 1
3
(ei+2+gi+2+ei+1+gi+1)
25
uhi(r) > uei(r) ⇐⇒
1
3
(fi+1+hi+1−ei+2)
1− 1
3
(ei+2+gi+2)
< −(ci+2 − ci+1)
Denote by k∗
1
3
(fi+1+hi+1)
1−1
3
(ei+2+gi+2+ei+1+gi+1)
and by k∗
1
3
(fi+1+hi+1−ei+2)
1−1
3
(ei+2+gi+2)
. We can rewrite
the conditions as functions of the costs.
Regions
A −(ci+2 − ci+1) > k∗
C k∗ < −(ci+2 − ci+1) < k∗
D −(ci+2 − ci+1) < k∗
The dynamics of replication by imitation for ei is given by the following equa-
tion:
3∆imitei = 2eigi(uei(r)−ugi(r))+



figi(ufi(r)− ugi(r))− eihi(uhi(r)− uei(r))
−eihi(uhi(r)− uei(r))
0
A
C
D
(3.7)
The change in fi is given by the following equation:
.
fi = ∆tradefi + v∆
imit
fi
(3.8)
Notice again that ∆tradeei = −∆tradefi .
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3∆tradefi = −fi(ei+2 + gi+2) (3.9)
The dynamics of replication by imitation for fi is given by the following equa-
tion:
3∆imitfi = 2fihi(ufi(r)−uhi(r))+



0
−figi(ugi(r)− ufi(r))
eihi(uei(r)− uhi(r))− figi(ugi(r)− ufi(r))
A
C
D
(3.10)
The change in gi is given by the following equation:
.
gi = ∆tradegi + v∆
imit
gi
(3.11)
Agents of type βi holding their production good i + 1 can decrease the share
gi, consequently increase the share hi in their population if they exchange i + 1
for i+ 2. This happens if an agent of type βi holding i+ 1 and an agent β(i+ 1)
holding i+ 2 are selected (with probability 1
3
gi(ei+1 + gi+1)). If agents of type βi
holding their production good i + 1 exchange i + 1 for i + 2, they decrease the
share gi and consequently increase the share hi.
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On the other hand, agents of type βi holding the good i + 2 can increase
the share gi and consequently decrease the share hi in their population if they
exchange i+2 for i+1. This happens if an agent of type βi holding i+2 and an
agent β(i + 2) holding i are selected (with probability 1
3
hi(ei+2 + gi+2)). Notice
that ∆tradegi = −∆
trade
hi
.
The resulting dynamics is given by the following equation:
3∆tradegi = hi(ei+2 + gi+2)− gi(ei+1 + gi+1) (3.12)
The dynamics of replication by imitation for gi is given by the following equa-
tion:
3∆imitgi = 2eigi(ugi(r)−uei(r))+



figi(ugi(r)− ufi(r)) + eihi(uhi(r)− uei(r))
eihi(uhi(r)− uei(r))
0
A
C
D
(3.13)
The change in hi is given by the following equation:
.
hi = ∆tradehi + v∆
imit
hi
(3.14)
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Notice again that ∆tradegi = −∆
trade
hi
.
3∆tradehi = −hi(ei+2 + gi+2) + gi(ei+1 + gi+1) (3.15)
The dynamics of replication by imitation for hi is given by the following equa-
tion:
3∆imithi = 2fihi(uhi(r)−ufi(r))+



0
figi(ugi(r)− ufi(r))
eihi(uhi(r)− uei(r)) + figi(ugi(r)− ufi(r))
A
C
D
(3.16)
3.3. Suﬃcient conditions of instability
The fundamental and speculative equilibria are rest points of the dynamics given
by equations 3.5-3.16. At this point, we will study the stability of these equilibria.
Again, to simplify the analysis c1 will be 0.01, and c2 will be 0.04. There are as
a result two parameters with respect to which we can analyse their stability. In
order to determine the conditions under which they are stable, the characteristic
polynomial of the Jacobian has to be computed. This polynomial turns out to
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be a ninth degree polynomial and we can not define the roots of the characteris-
tic polynomial as explicit functions of the parameters. Remark that in order to
conclude to instability, we need to prove that there exists at least one positive
eigenvalue. Consequently, the product of the eigenvalues is checked. Since there
is an odd number of roots and the coeﬃcients of the polynomial are real, if the
product is positive, there exists at least one positive root. This allows us to deter-
mine in terms of the parameters, regions where the fundamental and speculative
equilibria fail to be stable.
First, we will analyse the conditions under which the fundamental equilibrium
is stable. The fundamental equilibrium is represented by the population states
σ1 = (1, 0, 0) for the agents of type 1, σ2 = (0, 0, 0.5) for the agents of type 2
and σ3 = (1, 0, 0) for the agents of type 3. The conditions for the evolutionary
dynamics are computed for these population states.
A −(c3 − c2) > 13 −(c1 − c3) > 0 −(c2 − c1) > 0
C −1
4
< −(c3 − c2) < 13 −
1
2
< −(c1 − c3) < 0 0 < −(c2 − c1) < 0
D −(c3 − c2) < −14 −(c1 − c3) < −
1
2
−(c2 − c1) < 0
Note that only A is satisfied for the agents of type 2, and only D is satisfied
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for the agents of type 3. For the agents of type 1, C and D are satisfied.
As a result, there are two cases to analyse:
1. −1
4
< −(c3 − c2)
2. −(c3 − c2) < −14
For both cases, the analysis is done based on the characteristic polynomial.
The product of the eigenvalues are computed based on the characteristic polyno-
mial. The case where the product of the eigenvalues is zero is depicted by a curve
in order to visualise the combinations of the parameters for which the product of
the eigenvalues is positive. The first case is depicted by the Figure (3.1). The
product of the eigenvalues is negative at the left of the graph which covers the
parameters range in consideration. As a result, the instability of the fundamental
equilibrium can not be concluded by the product of the eigenvalues for the first
case. The second case is depicted by Figure (3.2). The product of the eigenvalues
is positive at the right of the curve. As a result, the fundamental equilibrium is
not stable for this combination of parameters.
Second, we will analyse the conditions under which the speculative equilibrium
is stable. The speculative equilibrium is represented by the population states
σ1 = (0, 0,
√
2/2) for the agents of type 1, σ2 = (0, 0,
√
2 − 1) for the agents
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Figure 3.1: Case 1 Fundamental equilibrium
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Figure 3.2: Case 2 Fundamental equilibrium
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of type 2 and σ3 = (1, 0, 0) for the agents of type 3. The conditions for the
evolutionary dynamics are computed for these population states.
A −(c3 − c2) > 0.37 −(c1 − c3) > 0 −(c2 − c1) > 0.16
C −0.21 < −(c3 − c2) < 0.37 0 < −(c1 − c3) < 0 0.11 < −(c2 − c1) < 0.16
D −(c3 − c2) < −0.21 −(c1 − c3) < 0 −(c2 − c1) < 0.11
Note that only A is satisfied for the agents of type 2, and only D is satisfied
for the agents of type 3. For the agents of type 1, C and D are satisfied.
As a result, there are two cases to analyse:
1. −0.21 < −(c3 − c2)
2. −(c3 − c2) < −0.21
For both cases, the product of the eigenvalues are computed based on the
characteristic polynomial. The case where the product of the eigenvalues is zero
is depicted by a curve in order to visualise the combinations of the parameters for
which the product of the eigenvalues is positive. The first case is depicted by the
Figure (3.3). The product of the eigenvalues is negative at the left of the graph
which covers the parameters range in consideration. As a result, the instability of
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Figure 3.3: Case 1 Speculative equilibrium
the speculative equilibrium can not be concluded by the product of the eigenvalues
for the first case. The second case is depicted by Figure (3.4). The product of
the eigenvalues is positive at the left of the curve. As a result, the speculative
equilibrium is not stable for this combination of parameters.
4. Conclusion
The standard search theoretic models of the emergence of money assumes random
bilateral encounters between a large number of agents. The evolutionary exten-
sions of these models retain the random matching assumption. The first objective
of this paper was to explore a version of the commodity money model in Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989) with endogenous meetings and to study the implications of
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Figure 3.4: Case 2 Speculative equilibrium
endogenizing the matching process. The fundamental equilibrium in Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989) in which every exchange involves either agents trading for their
consumption goods or trading a higher storage cost good for a lower storage cost
good, the speculative equilibrium requiring some individuals to trade their produc-
tion good for one with a higher storage cost can be stable under the endogenous
set up.
The second objective was to analyse the disequilibrium dynamics, when the
inventory distribution is not expected to be continuously at its temporary equilib-
rium value. We found suﬃcient conditions for the instability of the fundamental
and speculative equilibria. The findings are not in accordance with the earlier
results in the literature. For instance, for the same range of parameter values
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as in Sethi (1999), the disequilibrium dynamics defined in this paper, result in
instability.
5. Appendix
For the convenience, the propositions are restated before their proofs.
(Proposition 2.1) The set of rest points Φ(s) is non-empty for all values of
si for all i = 1, 2, 3.
Proof. Given s ∈ [0, 1]3, define a continuous function F (p) as follows:
Fi(p) = pi + (1− pi)pi+2ai − (si + pi − 1)pi+1ai+1
Since pi+2 > 1− si+2 and pi+1 6 1 we have the following inequality:
Fi(p) > pi + (1− pi)(1− si+2)ai − (si + pi − 1)ai+1
= pi(1− ai+1) + (1− pi)(1− si+2)ai + (1− si)ai+1
To check whether Fi(p) > 1− si:
pi(1− ai) + (1− pi)(1− si+2)ai + (1− si)ai+1
?
> 1− si
pi(1− ai) + (1− pi)(1− si+2)ai
?
> (1− ai+1)(1− si)
Dividing both sides by (1− ai+1) we get the following inequality.
pi + (1− pi)(1− si+2) ai1−ai+1
?
> (1− si)
As pi > (1 − si) and (1 − pi)(1 − si+2) ai1−ai+1 > 0 from the fact that pi and
si+2 lie both in the unit interval and πi 6 1 for all i = 1, 2, 3 we conclude that
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Fi(p) > 1− si.
Since pi+1 > 1− si+1 and pi+2 6 1 we have the following inequality:
Fi(p) 6 pi + (1− pi)ai − (si + pi − 1)(1− si+1)ai+1
= pi(1− ai) + ai − (si + pi − 1)(1− si+1)ai+1
To check whether Fi(p) 6 1:
pi(1− ai) + ai − (si + pi − 1)(1− si+1)ai+1
?
6 1
pi(1− ai)− (si + pi − 1)(1− si+1)ai+1
?
6 1− ai
Diving both sides by (1− ai) we get the following inequality:
pi − (si + pi − 1)(1− si+1) ai+11−ai
?
6 1
As pi 6 1 and (si+ pi− 1)(1− si+1) ai+11−ai > 0 from the fact that si+ pi− 1 and
si+1 lie both in the unit interval and πi 6 1 for all i = 1, 2, 3 we conclude that
Fi(p) 6 1.
Hence F : ∆s → ∆s. Since ∆s is a compact set and F is continuous, we have
by Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem the existence of a p∗ satisfying F (p∗) = p∗. At
any such point we have (1− pi)pi+2ai− (si+ pi− 1)pi+1ai+1 = 0 by the definition
of F so p∗ is a fixed point of the inventory dynamics defined by equation (2.1).
(Proposition 2.2) Suppose s 6= (1, 1, 1), the set of rest points Φ(s) contains
a single element.
The proof of three preliminary results will lead to the proof of the proposition.
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Lemma 1 Suppose s 6= (1, 1, 1), πi 6= 0 and πi 6= 1 for all i = 1, 2, 3. If
p ∈ Φ(s) then pi > 0 for all i = 1, 2, 3.
Proof. If p ∈ Φ(s) then from equation (2) we have
(1− pi)pi+2ai − (si + pi − 1)pi+1ai+1 = 0
Suppose p1 = 0. This requires that s1 = 1. Then the above equation results
in p3 = 0 implying s3 = 1. If p3 = 0 from the above equation we have p2 = 0
implying s2 = 1. This contradicts the assumption s 6= (1, 1, 1).
Lemma 2 Suppose s 6= (1, 1, 1), πi 6= 0 and πi 6= 1. If p ∈ Φ(s) and p0 ∈ Φ(s)
then either p = p0 or pi 6= p0i for all i = 1, 2, 3.
Proof. As p and p0 ∈ Φ(s) they satisfy equation (2.1). Rearranging the terms
we have the following equation that is well defined under the assumptions and
pi > 0 from Lemma 1.
si = (1− pi)
·
1 +
aipi+2
ai+1pi+1
¸
(5.1)
Suppose that p and p0 have at least one common element. Without loss of gener-
ality, suppose p1 = p01. Then either (i) p2 = p
0
2 or (ii) p2 < p
0
2 or (iii) p2 > p
0
2. In
case (i) it must also be true that p3 = p03 otherwise equation (5.1) could not be
satisfied for both p and p0. In case (ii), equation (5.1) implies that p3 < p03. But
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p2 < p
0
2 and p3 < p
0
3 are inconsistent if p = p
0, so case (ii) is impossible. In case
(iii), equation (5.1) implies that p3 > p03. But p2 > p
0
2 and p3 > p
0
3 are inconsistent
with equation (5.1) if p = p0, so case (iii) is impossible. Hence if p and p0 have a
common element, they are identical.
Lemma 3 Suppose s 6= (1, 1, 1), πi 6= 0 and πi 6= 1. If p ∈ Φ(s) and p0 ∈ Φ(s)
then either p > p0 or p < p0 or p = p0.
Proof. Suppose s 6= (1, 1, 1) and p ∈ Φ(s) and p0 ∈ Φ(s). Suppose p 6= p0. Then
from the previous lemma, we know that all their elements diﬀer. Consequently, at
least two elements of one vector must be strictly greater than the corresponding
two elements of the other. Suppose, without loss of generality, that p1 > p01 and
p2 > p
0
2 . This implies that p3 > p
0
3 and p > p
0. Reversing the inequalities yields
the remainder of the lemma. Suppose p ∈ Φ(s) and p0 ∈ Φ(s), with p 6= p0.
Following the previous lemma, we have either p > p0 or p < p0. Without loss of
generality, assume that p < p0 with p1 < p01 . This implies
p3
p2
<
p03
p02
. By equation
(5.1) we have p3
p2
>
p03
p02
. If p ∈ Φ(s) and p0 ∈ Φ(s), p 6= p0 is impossible.
(Proposition 2.3) Suppose s = (1, 1, 1), πi 6= 0 and πi 6= 1. The set of
rest points Φ(s) contains exactly two elements, exactly one of which is stable with
respect to the dynamics of equation (2.1).
Proof. If s = (1, 1, 1) then
.
pi = (1−pi)pi+2ai−pipi+1ai+1. Setting
.
pi = 0 we get
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two rest points: p = (0, 0, 0) and (ρ41, ρ
4
2, ρ
4
3). In order to check if these rest points
are asymptotically stable we calculate the eigenvalues of the following Jacobian:
∂F
∂p
=


−a1p3 − a2p2 −a2p1 a1(1− p1)
a2(1− p2) −a2p1 − a3p3 −a3p2
−a1p3 a3(1− p3) −a3p2 − a1p1


At p = (0, 0, 0) the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are w, w(−1/2 ± i√3/2) where
w = (a1a2a3)
1/3 > 0 as πi lie in the unit interval for all i = 1, 2, 3. p is unstable
at p = (0, 0, 0). At p = (ρ41, ρ
4
2, ρ
4
3) the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are w
0 − w00
3
,
−1
2
w0− w00
3
± i
√
3
2
w0 where w00 = (a1+ a2)ρ41+(a2+ a3)ρ
4
2+(a1+ a3)ρ
4
3 > 0 and as
πi and pi lie in the unit interval for all i = 1, 2, 3. So p is stable at p = (ρ41, ρ
4
2, ρ
4
3).
−2w00
3
< w0 < w
00
3
(Proposition 2.4) Suppose πi 6= 0 and πi 6= 1. The function ρ(s) is continu-
ous at all monomorphic states and at all polymorphic states of the type s = (x, 1, 0)
where x ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Define the function F (s, p) : R3 ×R3 → R3 as follows:
Fi(s, p) = (1− pi)pi+2ai − (si + pi − 1)pi+1ai+1 for all i = 1, 2, 3.
Since F (s, p) is continuously diﬀerentiable at any (s, p), we have the following
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matrix.
∂F
∂p
=


−a1p3 − a2p2 −a2(s1 + p1 − 1) a1(1− p1)
a2(1− p2) −a2p1 − a3p3 −a3(s2 + p2 − 1)
−a1(s3 + p3 − 1) a3(1− p3) −a3p2 − a1p1


If this matrix is invertible at (s, p), then by the implicit function theorem, there are
open sets U ∈ R3 and V ∈ R3 with (s, p) ∈ U×V and a unique continuously diﬀer-
entiable function, ρ : U → V such that F (s0, ρ(s0)) = 0 for all s0 ∈ U . ρ(s) is con-
tinuous at all monomorphic population states if ∂F∂p is invertible at all such states.
By symmetry, it is suﬃcient to check this for states s = (0, 0, 0), s = (0, 1, 0),
s = (1, 1, 0), s = (1, 1, 1). At the values of inventories corresponding to these
states (Table 2), the determinant of ∂F∂p is equal to − (a1 + a2) (a1 + a3) (a2 + a3),
(1 − a2)−2(a2(1 − a2) + a23)(a1 + a3)(a22 − a1a3 − a2), −(a1ρ33 + a2ρ32)(a1a2 +
a1a3ρ
3
3 + a2a3ρ
3
2 + a
2
3ρ
3
2), a1a2a3 − a1a2a3ρ41 − a1a2a3ρ42 − a1a2a3ρ43 − a1a22(ρ41)2 −
a2a
2
3(ρ
4
2)
2 + a1a2a3ρ
4
1ρ
4
2 + a1a2a3ρ
4
1ρ
4
3 + a1a2a3ρ
4
2ρ
4
3 − a22a3ρ41ρ42 − a1a23ρ42ρ43 − a21a2ρ41
ρ43 − a21a3(ρ43)2 − 4a1a2a3ρ41ρ42ρ43 respectively. In each case the determinant is non
zero, so ∂F∂p is invertible.
We now prove continuity at all points s = (z, 1, 0). If s = (z, 1, 0), then
p = ( a3w
a2(1−w) , w, 1) where w is the root of the following second degree equation:
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w2(a22(z − 1)− a2a3) + w(−a1(a2 + a3)− a22(z − 1)) + a1a2. At these values, the
determinant of the Jacobian is:
−wa2a3(1− w)−2 (a2(1− w) + a1)×
¡
a22 (1− z)− a1a3 + 2a2w (a2 (z − 1)− a3) + a2w2 (a2 (1− z) + a3)
¢
. Since the determinant can not be zero for all values of 0 < w < 1, the Jacobian
is invertible.
(Proposition 2.5) Suppose c1 < c2 < c3.
1. (Fundamental equilibrium) If (c3− c2) > a1− a2+ a2a3a3+a2 there is an asymp-
totically stable rest point at s = (0, 1, 0).
2. (Speculative equilibrium) If (c3− c2) < a1− a2+ ρ32a2 there is an asymptot-
ically stable rest point at s = (1, 1, 0).
To prove the proposition, we need to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Given a monomorphic population state s and a monotonic selection
dynamic ξi, s is asymptotically stable if (2si − 1)(uβi(s)− uαi(s)) > 0 for all i.
Proof. Suppose J = {i : s∗i = 1} and K = {i : s∗i = 0}. If for all i, (2si −
1)(uiβ(s)−uiα(s)) > 0, then uiβ(s∗) > uiα(s∗)when i ∈ J and uiβ(s) < uiα(s) when
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i ∈ K. By continuity of payoﬀs in population shares, there exists a neighborhood
N of s∗ such that, for all s ∈ N − s∗, uiβ(s∗) > uiα(s∗) when i ∈ J and uiβ(s) <
uiα(s) when i ∈ K. If the dynamics fi(s) are monotonic, then fi(s) > 0 when
i ∈ J and fi(s) < 0 when i ∈ K.
The Lemma states simply that a monomorphic population state s is asymp-
totically stable if uβi(s∗) > uiα(s∗) in those sub-populations i which consist exclu-
sively of β-types, and uβi(s∗) < uiα(s∗) in those sub-populations i which consist
exclusively of α-types. The proposition now may be proved.
Proof. For s = (0, 1, 0) to be asymptotically stable we need the following
conditions: u1α(s) > u1β(s), u2α(s) < u2β(s), u3α(s) > u3β(s). For s = (0, 1, 0),
the equilibrium inventory holdings are ρ(s) = (1, ρ22, 1) where ρ
2
2 is equal to
a2
a3+a2
.
u1α(s)− u1β(s) = (
a2−a1−c2+c3−a2ρ22)a2ρ22
a1+a2ρ22
u2α(s)− u2β(s) = − (a2+c3−c1)a3a3+a2
u3α(s)− u3β(s) = (c2−c1)a1a1+ρ22a3
For s = (1, 1, 0) to be asymptotically stable we need the following conditions:
u1α(s) < u1β(s), u2α(s) < u2β(s), u3α(s) > u3β(s). For s = (1, 1, 0), the equilib-
rium inventory holdings are ρ(s) = (ρ31, ρ
3
2, 1) where ρ
3
1 is given by the equation
(2.2) and ρ32 is by the equation (2.3).
u1α(s)− u1β(s) = (
a2−a1−c2+c3−a2ρ32)a2ρ32
a1+a2ρ32
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u2α(s)− u2β(s) = − (c3−c1)a3a3+ρ31a2
u3α(s)− u3β(s) = (a1−c1+c2−a1ρ1)a1ρ1a1ρ31+ρ32a3
(Proposition 2.6) Suppose c1 < c2 < c3.
If a1−a2+
−a1(1−a1)+
√
a21(1−a1)2+4a1a22(1−a2−a1)
2(1−a1−a2) < (c3−c2) < a1−a2+
a22
1−a1 there
is an asymptotically stable rest point at s = (x, 1, 0) where x ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The resulting equilibrium inventories for s = (x, 1, 0) is p = (ρ51, ρ
5
2, 1)
where
ρ51 =
ρ52a3
(1− ρ52)a2
and ρ52 is given by the following equation:
a2(a3 + a2(1− x))(ρ52)2 + (a1(a2 + a3)− a22(1− x))ρ52 − a1a2 = 0
>From this equation we get:
ρ52 =
−a1 a2+a3a2 + a2(1− x) +
q
(a1
a2+a3
a2
− a2(1− x))2 + 4a1(a3 + a2(1− x))
2(a3 + a2(1− x))
Rest points of the evolutionary dynamics require all surviving strategies to have
equal payoﬀs. Then for an interior point such as s = (x, 1, 0) where x ∈ (0, 1), we
must have u1α(s) = u1β(s). At s = (x, 1, 0) and p = (ρ51, ρ
5
2, 1):
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u1α(s) = (1− ρ52)a2 − c2
u1β(s) =
−a1c2+a1a2−a2c3ρ52
a1+a2ρ52
Solving u1α(s)− u1β(s) = 0 we get:
x =
(c3 − c2 + a2) ((1− a1)(c3 − c2 + a2 − a1)− a22)
a2 (c3 − c2 − a1) (c3 − c2 + a2 − a1)
We must ensure that x > 0 and x < 1. As x ∈ (0, 1), we have ρ51 > ρ31.
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